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PRESUMPTIONS AS TO FOREIGN LAW
By ROBERT VON MOSCIEZISKER*C OURTS are frequently confronted with the problem of deter-
mining litigation arising out of transactions that occurred in
a foreign jurisdiction, and, although it became settled at an early
dati that such matters were to be governed by the law of the
jurisdiction where they originated,-law of which the courts do
not take judicial notice,-yet the books are filled with an ever-
increasing number of cases containing no direct evidence of the
foreign law involved.
The question arises, Upon whom rests the burden of proving
relevant foreign law? In the normal course of things, it would
seem that this obligation, like other burdens of proof, should rest
on him who has the affirmative of the issue on the merits,-the
plaintiff whose declaration is met by a traverse or the defendant
who sets up an affirmative defense. To facilitate the disposition
of cases, however, the courts indulge in a presumption, the effect
of which is to shift the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence of foreign law.' The presumption employed is that the
law of the foreign state and that of the forum are alike when
both are based on the same general system of law; and, if such
common foundation exists, the court takes judicial notice of that
fact. The use, to this extent, of a presumption as to foreign law,
is common to all our courts; but, if the general system of law
prevailing in the foreign jurisdiction is not that of the forum,
there is no sound basis for a presumption of similarity in particu-
*Chief Justice of Pennsylvania.
'For a full discussion of the effect of this presumption upon tho
burden of proof, see Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 Harv. L.
Rev. 401; 5 Wigrnore, Evidence, sec. 2536.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
lar laws, and generally it is refused in such cases,2 thus leaving
the burden of proving the. foreign law on him who has the affirm-
ative of the issue on the merits.3
To this point, we have had in mind the unwritten law, for the
rule as above described will not logically admit of a presumption
of similarity in the field of statutory law,-that is, of similarity
between the law of the foreign jurisdiction involved and the lex
scripta of the forum,--except, perhaps, where the statute under
consideration is merely declaratory of common law previously
existing. What, then, shall the court do where the applicable
foreign law is unknown to it, and the local law on the subject is
statutory and different from the common law? Shall there be no
presumption or other guiding rule?
Some cases' have answered these questions by laying down a
very convenient and inclusive doctrine, which not only solves the
difficulties as to statute law in the forum but also obviates the
necessity of inquiring into the nature of the basic legal system" of
the foreign jurisdiction. Their rule, abandoning reliance upon
presumptions, is to the effect that, in the absence of proof of the
controlling foreign law, the law of the forum, whether common
or statutory, will be applied.' The great majority of courts,
however, prefer to treat the problem in terms of presumptions;
and, where the presumption of similarity exists. he who claims
the foreign law to be different from that of the forum must
prove the fact asserted. Our present inquiry is as to how far
the doctrine of presumptions may legitimately be carried with
respect to statutory law.
2 Aslanian v. Dostumian, (1899) 174 Mass. 328, 54 N.E. 846, 47 L. R.
A. 495; Banco de Sonoro v. Bankers' Cas. Co., (1904) 124 Iowa 576, 100
N. W. 532, 536, 104 Am. St. Rep. 367; Savage v. O'Neil, (1871) 44 N. Y.
298, 301; 5 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2536.
3Certain fundamental legal principles are presumed, however, as a
matter of course, even in such cases. Of this kind are those which estab-
lish the right to enforce a contractual promise. Thus in Thompson v.
Ketcham, (1811) 8 Johns. (N.Y.) 189, 193-4, although the court refused
to presume that infancy was a defense to a contract under the law of
Jamaica, it assumed without question that the law of Jamaica made con-
tracts enforceable, and permitted a recovery by the plaintiff. See Kales,
Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 409.
4E. g. The Hoxie (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1924) 297 Fed. 189, 190; Allen v.
Watson, (1834) 2 Hill, Law (S.C.) 319, 322; Lillard v. Lierley, (1918)
200 Mo. App. 140, 202 S. W. 1057, 1059; Pauska v. Daus, (1868) 31 Tex.
67, 73: Carron v. Abounador, (1923) 28 N. Mex. 491, 214 Pac. 772, 774.
5See article by Professor Kales, Presumptions of the Foreign Law,
discussing the propriety of this rule, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 401.
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Several of the traditionally conservative states, if not a majority
of jurisdictions east of the Mississippi, have restricted themselves
to the original bounds of the presumption,-- that the foreign law
is similar to the lex nonscripta, or common law, of the forum.'
If the law of the forum has been altered by statute, the altera-
tion is ignored in such cases, and the previously existing common
law becomes the standard. The statutory law of the forum is
not employed either as the basis for presumption or as a rule of
decision. How far beyond this position can we go and still re-
main within the bounds of sound reasoning?
The ease with which presumption may be invoked to dispose
of troublesome cases is not without its dangers. There is a
61n New York, a few early cases show some hesitation on the ques-
tion. McCulloch v. Norwood, (1874) 58 N. Y. 562, 567; Harris v. White,(1880) 81 N. Y. 532, 544, and one seems to have applied the New York law
of interest to an Ohio contract, Leavenworth v. Brockway, (1842) 2 Hill(N.Y.) 201, 202) ; but later cases have been uniformly against the pre-
sumption in respect to statutory law; Cutler v. Wright, (1860), 22 N. Y.
471, 474; Whitford v. Panama R. R. Co., (1861) 23 N. Y. 465, 470-1;
McDonald v. Mallory, (1879) 77 N. Y. 546, 550, 33 Am. Rep. 664; Leonard
"v. Columbia Steam Nay. Co., (1881) 84 N. Y. 48, 53; Robb v. Wash. & J.
College, (1906) 185 N. Y. 485, 496, 78 N. E. 359, 363; Murrin v. ArchbaldConsol. Coal Co., (1921) 232 N. Y. 541, 134 N. E. 563, 564; Crehan v.
Megargel, (1922) 199 App. Div. 649, 192 N. Y. S. 290, 300. The last-cited
case was modified in the court of appeals, Crehan v. Megargel, (19") 234
N. Y. 67, 136 N.E. 296, 302, and although the ruling as to presumptions
was not disturbed, the language of the opinion of the higher court seems
to approach the rule of applying the lex fori as such. One other case,
Standard Casing Co. Inc. v. California Casing Co. Inc., (1922) 233 N. Y.
413, 135 N. E. 834, 835 does make the presumption as to the Uniform
Sales Act, but it does so expressly because that act was regarded as a codi-
fication of the common law.
Massachusetts, likewise, has stood firm on the conservative rule,
which is frequently repeated in general terms,--that the presumption can
be made only as to common law: Murphy v. Collins, (1876) 121 Mass.
6-7; Kelley v. Kelley; (1894), 161 Mass. 111, 36 N. E. 837, 838, 25 L. R. A.
806, 42 Am. St. Rep. 389; Cherry v. Sprague, (1904) 187 Mass. 113, 72
N. E. 456, 457, 67 L. R. A. 33, 105 Am. St. Rep. 381; Lemieux v. Boston &
Maine R. R. Co, (1914) 219 Mass. 399, 106 N. E. 992, 993; John B. Frey
Co. Inc. v. S. Silk, Inc. (1923) 245 Mass. 534, 140 N. E. 259, 261. In
Farmers National Bank of Annapolis v. Venner, (1906) 192 Mass. 531, 78
N. E. 540, 541, the presumption is made in respect to the Negotiable Instru-
ment Law, but it is on a point on which the act merely codified the com-
mon law.
Indiana originally adopted the conservative view, Smith %. Muncie
National Bank, (1867) 29 Ind. 158, 161; B. & 0. S. W. R. R. Co. v.
Hollenbeck, (1903) 161 Ind. 452, 69 N. E. 136, 138; Wabash R. RL Co. v.
Hassett, (1908) 170 Ind. 370, 83 N. E. 705, 707; but a recent case in the
appellate court of that state, Spielman v. Herskovitz, (19") 78 Ind. App.
131, 134 N. E. 909, 911, presumes that the law of Illinois, like that of
Indiana, no longer permits coverture to be a defense to a woman's surety-
ship contract.
For a list of states that are in accord with Massachusetts and New
York, see Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 Harv. L Rev. 401,
406, note in 67 L. R. A. 33; 5 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2536, note.
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temptation to extend presumptions, in their origin legitimate, to
situations in which logic denies them place, courts and counsel
either forgetting the circumstances that justified the original pre-
sumption or failing to perceive the absence of such circumstances
from the case in hand.
A presumption of fact is justifiable only where there is a
strong probability that the fact presumed is true; without this
probability, the so-called presumption becomes an arbitrary rule
of law, lacking foundation, except, perhaps, as a measure of con-
venience or of public policy.1
At the outset, we may safely say that no rule which seeks to
justify all presumptions as to common law and exclude all as
to statutory law can be accepted. As is pointed out by M. M.
Bigelow, in a note to Story's Conflict of Laws," in ordinary cases
involving jurisdictions which have the common law as the basis
of their jurisprudence, the presumption is proper that the general
principles of that system are there in force; yet many common
law principles have been so universally altered that to presume
their existence in their original form is to run counter to all
probability. For example, rare indeed are the jurisdictions, if
there be any, where married women's rights remain as at common
law, or where the common law governs the succession to land.
On the other hand, in many fields of law, there are uniform stat-
utes, varying, perhaps, in detail, but alike in their essentials,
which have become well-nigh universal; and, if a presumption
is at all proper, it may be indulged as to the existence of such
statutes. There are, for instance, few states in which agreements
for the sale of land must not be in writing, or where notaries
public are not authorized to take acknowledgments and administer
oaths; nevertheless, cases may be found where, simply because
the lex fori on those subjects was statutory, no presumption of a
similar law in the foreign jurisdiction was permitted.
The language of the cases in the jurisdictions which go be-
yond the traditional presumption as to correspondence in com-
7Story, Conflict of Laws, note to sec. 637, 8th ed. by M. M. Bigelow.
sIbid.
9For this reason some courts refuse to presume that parol contracts
for sale of land are unenforceable (see Ellis v. Maxson, (1869), 19 Mich.
186-7, 2 Am. Rep. 81; Miller v. Wilson, (1893) 146 Ill. 523, 34 N. E. 1111,
1113, 37 Am. St. Rep. 186), and others refuse to presume the power of
notaries public to administer oaths or take acknowledgments: see Hol-
brook v. Libby, (1915) 113 Me. 389, 94 Atd. 483, Greeley v. Greeley,(1919), 118 Me. 491, 107 Ati. 296; contra, Lavelle v. Prudential Ins. Co.,(1892) 6 York (Pa.) 18, 2 Lackawanna Jurist (Pa.) 306.
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mon lav rules, marks practically no limit on the extent to which
the presumption concerning the similarity of laws will be em-
ployed. The only expressions on the subject are such as: "This rule
[as to the presumption of similarity] applies to the statute law
of the state as well as to the common law" ;"o or, "Nor is the pre-
sumption avoided because the law of [the forum] happens to be
a statute."" In one or tAo cases it has been said that the pre-
sumption as to similarity of statutory law will not be employed
where to do so would impose a penalty or work a forfeiture. 1- A
few states, notably California, Texas and Oklahoma, although
claiming to apply the theory of presumptions, have taken an at-
titude which in reality is no less than an arbitrary rule, that, in
the absence of proof of the foreign law, the law of the forum
will always control; thus California makes the "presumption" of
similarity in all cases. In other words, whether the foreign
statute be based on common law or not, California courts presume
it to be identical with the code of that state.'" Many other courts,
however, apparently having had fewer occasions to pass on the
point, do not employ the presumption in respect to so great a
variety of statutes; but, aside from those that say it will not be
indulged where it would impose a penalty or work a forfeiture,
the writer has found but one intimation in the cases that any
limit on the use of the presumption was contemplated. 1 4 Obvious-
ly, however, if the theory of presumptions is retained in the field
of the written law, it must be subject to some limitations and these
should be marked out as far as is reasonably possible.
Of course no hard and fast distinction can be made as to what
particular statutes may properly be presumed to have counterparts
'
0 Hickman v. Alpaugh, (1862) 21 Cal. 225, 226.
"Oberlin v. Parry, (1926) 287 Pa. -, 134 Atd. 460.
12Harris v. White, (1880) 81 N. Y. 532, 44; Westheimer v. Habinck,
(1906) 131 Iowa 643, 109 N. W. 189, 190.
'
3Norris v. Harris, (1860) 15 Cal. 226, 252, powers of guardians,
Texas law; Hickman v. Alpaugh, (1862) 21 Cal. 226, fraudulent con-
veyances; Marsters v. Lash, (1882) 61 Cal. 622, 624, law of community
property; Palmer v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. Co., (1894) 101 Cal. 187,
35 Pac. 630, 633, liability of carrier of goods; Wickersham v. Johnson,(1894) 104 Cal. 407, 38 Pac. 89, power of executors, English law; Caval-
laro v. Tex. & Pac. Ay. Co., (1895) 110 Cal. 348, 42 Pac. 918, 921, liability
of carrier, Louisiana law; Corison v. Williams, (1922) 58 Cal. App. 282,
208 Pac. 331, 332. requisites for adortion of child, New IMexico law. See
also Schlotterbeck v. Schwinn, (1909) 23 Okla. 681, 103 Pac. 854; Sohner
v. Welliver, (1923) 95 Okla. 73, 218 Pac. 1069, 1070; Royal Neighbors of
America v. Fletcher, (1924) 99 Okla. 297, 277 Pac. 426, 429; Pauska v.
Daus, (1868) 31 Tex. 67, 73; Ferguson-McKinney Dry Goods Co. v. Gar-
rett, (Tex. Comm'n of App. 1923) 252 S. W. 738, 742.
'
4Wagenbauer v. Schwinn, (1926) 285 Pa. 128, 131 Ati. 699.
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in other jurisdictions, and it would be folly to attempt to list per-
missible and non-permissible presumptions in that regard; but
it may not be wholly without value to examine a few types of
cases which raise the question more or less frequently.
In some jurisdictions the presumption has been allowed that
the legal rate of interest in a foreign state is the same as that
prescribed by the statutes of the forum. 1" Such a presumption
certainly does serious violence to the ordinary laws of probability.
Although there were no usury statutes at common law, they
are universal now, and, if it was desirable, there could be little
objection, in principle, to a presumption that some limit on interest
rates exists in a foreign state; but to say that, because the statute
in force in the forum prescribes a maximum interest rate of six
per cent it is to be presumed that this same maximum is ordained
in a state two or three thousand miles away, or even in a neighbor
state, is to presume without a reasonable basis. This is an ex-
ample of a type of cases that make presumptions regarding simi-
larity in details of legislation,-a practice which cannot, in most
instances, be reconciled with the probability basis of presump-
tions. The probability that detailed features of statutes have
counterparts in other states is very slight, except, of course, in
the case of some of the so-called uniform acts, yet the courts
have gone far in allowing a presumption of similarity. To show
the extent of this abuse, we may cite cases which involve legis-
lation regulating the liability of insurance companies,0 statutes
making it an act of conversion to sell pledged property without
having given previous notice to the pledger, 1" prescribing rights
and liabilities of corporations and stockholders, 8 removing the
privilege of suit at law for injuries covered by workmen's com-
pensation statutes, 19 and establishing the system of community
property for husbands and wives.2"
"5Forsyth v. Baxter, (1839) 3 Ill. 9, 11; Chumasero v. Gilbert, (1860)
24 Ill. 293, 294, 26 Ill. 39, 41; Desnoyer v. McDonald Geisse & Co.. (1860)
4 Minn. 515, 520; Cooper & Lavely v. Reaney, (1860) 4 Minn. 528, 531;
Leavenworth v. Brockway, (1842) 2 Hill (N.Y.) 201, 202. (This is prob-
ably not now law in New York; see note 6, supra.)
IGNewton v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., (1915) 95 Kans. 427, 148 Pac. 619,621.
".Mechanics & Metals National Bank of City of N. Y. v. Pingree,
(1924) 40 Idaho 118, 232 Pac. 5, 8.
'sHamley v. Till, (1916) 162 Wis. 533, 156 N. W. 968; Sohner v.
Welliver, (1923) 95 Okla. 73. 218 Pac. 1069, 1070.
"9Freyman v. Day, (1919) 108 Wash. 71, 182 Pac. 940.
-0Marsters v. Lash, (1882) 61 Cal. 622, 624; Domritzer v. German
Say. & Loan Society, (1900) 23 Wash. 132, 62 Pac. 862, 886, aff'd (1904)
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The manner in which what Qught to be the controlling rule of
probability is sometimes ignored, may be observed in the Penn-
sylvania case of Bemett v. Cadwell,21 decided at an early stage
in the development of the theory of presumptions as to similarity
of statutory law. Cadwell, a liquidating partner, gave a bond to
protect his former associates in business from debts of the firm.
Judgment for one of these debts was obtained against Bennett,
an obligee in the bond, who sued thereon to recoup his loss; the
defense was that a judgment had previously been obtained in
Wisconsin for this same debt against all the partners except
Bennett, who had not been served, and that this had the effect in
law of discharging Bennett, hence he had no right of action against
Cadwell. In disposing of the case on appeal, the supreme court of
Pennsylvania said:
"It is undoubtedly true that by the common law a judgment
against one or more of several partners . . . is a bar to another
suit against the remaining partners who were not served [and
equally] clear that by the law of Pennsylvania it [is] not a bar to
the action . . . why, then, should we presume that it [is] by the
law of Wisconsin? . . . When Pennsylvania has abrogated the
technical rule of the common law . . . why should we presume
that it is in force in other states? There is no state where the
common law prevails [unmodified] by statute, and . . . what
foundation is there for the presumption that it exists in any state
without modification? We are bound to presume that the law of
Wisconsin is similar to our own."
Thus, while refusing to presume the retention of the
common law in Wisconsin, a presumption that would have
had some recognized basis of probability, the court presumed
the much less probable fact that Wisconsin had modi-
fied the common law, on what the court itself calls a techni-
cal subject,22 in the same respect and manner as Pennsylvania.
The result reached was correct, but the reasoning employed in
the.above excerpt from the opinion of the court rather ignores the
principles of probabilities. The real basis of the decision may
be found in that part of the opinion which immediately follows
192 U. S. 125, 24 Sup. Ct. 221, 48 L Ed. 373; Gunderson v. Gunderson,
(1901) 25 Wash. 459, 65 Pac. 791, 793; Ruggles v. Seedig, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923) 247 S. W. 650; Carron v. Abounador, (1923) 28 N. Mex. 491,
214 Pac. 772, 774.
21(1871) 70 Pa. St. 253, 257, 258, 259.
22Cf. Crehan v. Megargel, (1922) 199 App. Div. 649, 192 N. Y. 290,
300, which is directly contra in respect to a similar statute of New York.
See also this same case on appeal, Crehan v. Megargel, (1922) 234 N. Y.
67, 136 N. E. 296.
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the portion we have quoted, where the court said that, Pennsyl-
vania having ordained that nothing but satisfaction "bars a suit"
against an unserved partner, the Pennsylvania courts would not, on
some other theory of law, give greater effect to a judgment in an-
other state than to a similar judgment in their own state. Thus it
may be seen that the case really turned on the effect which would be
given to a judgment against several partners for a firm debt 'as
discharging another partner not served or included in the judg-
ment. No matter whether the judgment was entered by a local
or by a foreign court, the point of its effect in the respect indicated
was purely a domestic remedial question which did not involve
any inquiry as to similarities between the laws of Pennsylvania
and the laws of a foreign state or presumptions in that regard.
Another example of unwarranted presumptions appears in an
Iowa case. 3 In a suit to recover damages for failure of title to
land which the plaintiff had acquired in Missouri, it was necessary
for him to show that, prior to his purchase, there had been a fore-
closure proceeding in that state concerning which misrepresenta-
tions had been made; to this end, he offered evidence of a Mis-
souri sheriff's deed, but the court held that no valid foreclosure
had been proved, since, in the absence of evidence of the Missouri
law, it would be presumed to be the same as Iowa's, which required
a bill in equity, order of court, etc., for valid foreclosure, and
none of these essential steps were shown by the record of the
sheriff's deed. Here again, however, no presumption of similarity
between the law of Missouri and that of Iowa was properly in-
volved, as we shall now explain.
In respect to matters of remedy and procedure, the law of the
state where the procedure was had always controls.2 4 Hence, in
the Iowa case just mentioned, Iowa law in regard to the details
of practice in the foreclosure, should not have figured at all, since
Missouri was the state where the foreclosure took place; its law
controlled such procedure, and, after judgment, there was a pre-
sumption it had been properly followed, so there was no necessity
for proving it. Although in some cases the courts at times have
23Varner v. Interstate Exch., (1908) 138 Iowa 201, 115 N. W. 1111.
See also Edleman v. Edleman, (1905) 125 Wis. 270, 104 N. W. 56.24Leroux v. Brown, (1852) 12 C. B. 801, 814, 22 L. J. C. P. 1, 16 Jutr.
1021, 1 W. R. 22; Emery v. Burbank, (1895) 163 Mass. 326, 39 N. E.
1026. 28 L. R. A. 57, 47 Am. St. Rep. 456; Watson and wife v. Brewster,
(1845) 1 Pa. 381, 385; Mandru v. Ashby, (1908) 108 Md. 693, 71 Atl.
312, 313-4; Thomas v. Clarkson, (1906) 125 Ga. 72, 54 S. E. 77, 81, 6
L. R. A. (N.S.) 658.
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discussed presumptions 5 of similarity between their laws and
foreign laws in matters of remedy and procedure, yet, in most
such instances, the decision on the merits was justified on the
grourd that, as to procedure and procedural rights, the law of
the place where a remedy is sought always controls; therefore,
the rule of presumption as to similarity of laws had no application
and need not have been examined. Among laws which have been
held to go to remedy and procedure only, are statutes of limitations
and statutes of frauds.26
As said before, the one or two cases that do try to separate
the situations in which a presumption of like law will be employed
from those in which it will not, on any basis other than that of
the kind of law involved,-written or unwritten,-say that such
a course will not be pursued where to do so would impose a pen-
alty or work a forfeiture; 27 but in regard to this rule, if it may be
called a rule at all, we find wide variations in language and results.
There is a Georgia case2 s where the court refused to permit re-
covery on a note signed on Sunday in Kansas, because there was
no proof of Kansas law and the Georgia law made instruments
executed on Sunday void; this comes close to working a for-
feiture. On the other hand, the Iowa supreme court has in effect
held that, where a presumption of similarity of laws would defeat
a plaintiff's cause of action, to permit such presumption would
work a forfeiture, and, therefore, if to presume that a sale of
liquor in Missouri was illegal would prevent recovery on a con-
tract of sale,29 no such course would be alloved.
There is, perhaps, ground for a distinction between cases of
actual litigation, where there are opposing parties,-such as
ordinary suits at law,--and those in which the court is to a degree
performing administrative functions, such as the distribution of
estates. In the latter type of case, there may be times when, un-
less a presumption of detailed legislation is made, the court, on
whom lies, the duty to proceed, would be embarrassed in doing so;
though, of course, every judicial tribunal, unless denied the
25E. g. Bennett v. Cadwell, (1871) 70 Pa. 253 257; Scott v. Mundy &
Scott, (1922) 193 Iowa 1360, 188 N. W. 972, 979; Kelluni v. Robinson
(1922) 193 Iowa 1277, 188 N. W. 821, 822; Bennett, Treasurer v. Lohman.
(1922) 292 Mo. 477, 238 S. W. 792, 797.26See cases cited in note 24 supra.
2
--Note 12 supra.
2Hill v. Wilker, (1871) 41 Ga. 449, 453.
2'Samuel Westheimer and Sons v. Habinck, (1906) 131 Inw 6 2
N W 18O 1o
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natural attributes of a court, can, of its own volition, either call or
force the calling of relevant evidence on any essential matter be-
fore it for determination. In an adversary proceeding, when a
foreign law is involved and the court refuses to allow any pre-
sumption in regard thereto, the result is merely to shift the burden
of proof, and the party in default of proof loses; but when courts
are operating in administrative capacities, the controversial ele-
ment is not present, and most often there is no one in particular
to bear the burden of proof; therefore, in such situations, a pre-
sumption, for instance, that the foreign law of descent and dis-
tribution is identical with that of the forum may justifiably be
indulged.3
0
The doctrine of presumption is so imbedded in our law that
it would be difficult to uproot it, even if such a course were de-
sirable; but, when necessary, some courts have in effect departed
therefrom by adopting a theory of implied agreement that the
law of the forum shall govern whenever the foreign law is not
proved. For example, in an Alabama case,3' the court, after dis-
cussing the presumption that the foreign law was the same as
that of the forum, continued as follows:
"It will be applied, though our law be statutory. It may be well
said that, as we judicially know no other law of the case than our
own, the parties litigant, by failing to produce the lex loci con-
tractus, impliedly agree that it is the same as the lex fori, be the
latter common law or statute. Thus is may be regarded as settled in
this state that when a contract made in a state or country wherein
we cannot presume the existence of the common law, is sought
to be enforced in the courts of this state, and the lex loci is not
produced, we will apply to it our own law."
In another Alabama case,3 2 it was said:
"A majority of the court are of the opinion that, in the absence
of averment and proof of the laws of Florida, the parties, by in-
voking the jurisdiction of the Alabama court, submit themselves
to the laws of this state."
In an Indiana case, 33 the court held that the rule was there
settled that the common law must be presumed to be the law of
the foreign state; but added,
3OIn re E. G. Baughman's Estate, (1924) 281 Pa. 23, 37-8, 126 At.
58, 63.3
'Peet v. Hatcher, (1896) 112 Ala. 514, 21 So. 711, 713, 57 Am. St.
Rep. 45.
32Watford v. Ala. & Fla. Lumber Co., (1907) 152 Ala. 178, 44 So. 567,
569.
33Smith v. The Muncie National Bank, (1867) 29 Ind. 158, 161.
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"However reasonable it might be to conclude that where parties
have submitted their rights to be adjudicated upon in our courts,
if they do not introduce to the attention of the court any foreign
statute which might control its ruling, they should be held to have
elected to abide by the law of the former; still, we have too long
recognized the other rule [of presumption] to now question its
force."
To summarize: There is a well established presumption that
in jurisdictions enjoying the same general systems of law, the
rules of the common law are alike in both states, and, where for-
eign law is involved, the law of the forum is applied on this
theory. Courts divide on the general question of presuming f or-
eign law to be similar to statutes in force in the forum; some
courts will not allow such a presumption at all, while others insist
upon it, or permit it with limitations; beyond this, no general
classification can be found in the cases. In those jurisdictions
which allow the presumption, the qualification that it will not be
employed to work a forfeiture or impose a penalty is occasionally
stated, though not always regarded. A classification on a different
basis, that of probability,-the logical basis upon which all pre-
sumptions should rest,-is desirable. Jurisdictions which hereto-
fore have permitted no presumption in respect to statutory law
could, on the basis of probability, allow the presumption of simi-
larity where the statutory provision in question is of such general
acceptance that there is a likelihood of its existence in the foreign
state; and, on the other hand, jurisdictions in which the courts
have employed all-inclusive language excluding no types of statute,
could, on the basis of probability, limit the use of the presumption
to proper cases and prevent its misuse in regard to details of legis-
lation as to which there is no logical ground for a presumption,-
for instance, as suggested in a recent Pennsylvania case,3' legisla-
tion inv6lving the speed limit of automobiles. If the rational
test of probability is not adopted, then the theory of presumptions
had better be abandoned and, in the absence of proof of other
law, the law of the forum applied, on the theory of some of the
cases which we have reviewed that, by not bringing forth any
evidence concerning the law of the foreign jurisdiction involved,
the parties impliedly agree that the case shall be judged by the
law of the forum, whether common or statutory.
34Wageribauer v. Schwinn, (1926) 285 Pa. 128, 131 At. 699.
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN CANADA
By C. D. ALLIN*
T HE recent Canadian election has raised a number of interest-
ing questions in constitutional law, some of which are of
interest to all students of comparative government, and to Ameri-
can constitutionalists in particular. The question of the relative
merits of the cabinet and presidential systems of government has
long engaged the attention of political pundits. A small school of
American writers has extolled the superior merits of the English
system and has advocated its adoption in this country. The recur-
ring conflicts of the president and Congress, the succession of
constitutional deadlocks and the general futility of much of our
governmental activities have all served to lend a certain amount
of support to this contention. The fact that almost all modern
democratic states have adopted the English rather than the Ameri-
can form of executive afforded -further confirmation of the indict-
ment of our constitutional system. But recent political events
have effectively turned the tables upon the champions of the
system of responsible government. In more than one European
country the system of cabinet government has broken down and
has been replaced by a single executive. Throughout the British
Empire, it is true, the people still retain their faith in the superior
excellence of the cabinet system but the fulsome tributes of its
devotees no longer pass unchallenged. It is no more regarded as
a final and perfect form of government. Recent events in Canada
throw valuable sidelights upon certain unexpected developments
in the workings of the cabinet system which may exercise a con-
siderable influence upon the course of colonial history and the
character of colonial institutions. To these developments the
American public cannot afford to remain indifferent inasmuch as
the experience of our Northern neighbor may prove most useful
in helping us to find a solution of our own constitutional problem
of obtaining a closer cooperation between the executive and legis-
lative departments of government.
The facts of the controversy are comparatively simple and for
the most part indisputable. The rise of the Progressive party
placed a severe strain upon the smooth working of parliamentary
institutions at Ottawa. In the elections of 1921 the Conservative
*Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
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party went down to an overwhelming defeat but the Liberal gov-
ernment which succeeded to office was not able to command a
steady majority on the floor of the House of Commons and was
dependent upon the uncertain support of the Progressive mem-
bers. As the term of parliament drew to a close the position of
the government became more and more humiliating so that the
premier finally decided to appeal to the country for the return of
a clear working majority of his own party followers. But the
election returns belied his expectations, for the government's
plurality disappeared and it was left in a worse position than in
the previous election. The returns were as follows: Conserva-
tives 116; Liberals 101; Progressives 24. Although the Progres-
sive party had suffered an even severer blow in the elections than
had the Liberals, they were none the less in a much stronger
political position in the House inasmuch as they clearly held the
balance of power between the older parties. The Conservative
leaders-and press immediately demanded the resignation of the
government on the ground that their party commanded the largest
number of members in the incoming House. Premier King, how-
ever, refused to accede to this demand and advised the Governor-
General to leave the issue to the decision of the House itself. The
early summoning of parliament brought about a carnival of
intrigues on the part of the older political parties for the support
of the Progressive group.
As the policies of the Liberals and Progressives did not greatly
differ upon many questions, particularly on the matter of the
tariff, Mr. King succeeded in entering into a working alliance
with the Progressive leaders, by which the latter pledged the sup-
port of their party to the government in return for the promise
of certain legislation which was designed to promote the interests
of the Western farmers. Thanks to this support, the government
succeeded in beating off a series of attacks by the Conservative
party, but it still lead a most precarious existence from day to
day. The discovery of grave scandals in the administration of
the Customs department, which involved the reputation of the
minister of customs, at last turned the scales against the govern-
ment. Several of the Progressive members went into the opposi-
tion lobbies in the preliminary skirmishes which preceded the
crucial vote of censure on the Stevens amendment, and the govern-
ment was defeated on several occasions. Thereupon the premier
appealed to Lord Byng, the governor-general, for a dissolution
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of the House, but His Excellency refused to follow this advice
and in place thereof called upon Mr. Meighen, the Conservative
leader, to form a new government. Mr. Meighen accepted the
task, the more readily as he apparently entertained the hope or
expectation of securing the support of the Progressive party to
procure the necessary supplies and to wind up the legislative busi-
ness of the session. The Premier, however, did not dare to or-
ganize his government in due form by assigning the members to
definite departments, since the acceptance of these portfolios
would have entailed the resignation of the ministers at the very
moment when every vote was needed to keep the government in
office. He accordingly adopted the plan of setting up a temporary
ministry to close up the business of the session. The Liberal
party made a bitter attack upon this doubtful procedure, and suc-
ceeded in winning over a majority of the Progressives to their
constitutional point of view. The government was defeated by a
majority of one, whereupon Mr. Meighen also asked the governor-
general to dissolve the House. Lord Byng assented to this request
and the dissolution was carried out at once in somewhat uncere-
monious fashion.
The Liberal party has taken advantage of these unusual pro-
ceedings to launch a strong attack upon the unconstitutional char-
acter of the action of the governor-general and in these protests
they have been joined by a majority of the members of the Pro-
gressive party. The Conservative government, on the other hand,
has vigorously defended the action of the governor-general on both
constitutional and political grounds as a legitimate exercise of his
discretionary power in difficult circumstances.
It ought to be stated at the outset that the constitutional strug-
gle did not involve any attack upon the personal character and
political integrity of the governor-general. Lord Byng has been
one of the most popular representatives of the Crown in Canadian
history. Mr. King has been particularly careful to acknowledge
the good faith of the governor-general although he did criticise
both the legality and the expediency of his action. Still less did
the agitation involve any question of the separation of Canada
from the Empire. All three parties are strictly committed to the
British connection although they differ somewhat in their political
views as to the form of imperial organization. The question of
the governor-general's power of dissolution has nothing directly
to do with the question of imperial relations, though the subject
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does come up for incidental consideration as we shall see, in con-
nection with the closely related question as to the mode of appoint-
ing the king's representatives in the Dominions.
The real question at issue, therefore, resolves itself into one of
the constitutionality of the conduct of the governor-general and
his advisers. The American reader should remember, however,
that in Canada matters of constitutionality are essentially ques-
tions of parliamentary custom and political precedent rather than
of constitutional law, as in the United States.
The first of these questions concerns the right of the King
government to ask for a dissolution of parliament in the particular
circumitances. The answer to this question must depend upon the
practical effect of the dissolution on parliament rather than upon
the formal declaration of the government's intent. The nominal
motive for asking for dissolution was the desire to straighten out
the parliamentary situation, but the practical result would have
been to place a muzzle upon parliament at the moment it was hold-
ing a grand inquest of the nation into certain scandals, the true
facts of which it was entitled to know and to lay before the
country. To interrupt this inquiry in the circumstances came close
to an attack upon the privileges of parliament itself, since it is the
primary function of the House to pass upon the character of the
government's policy and to hold it responsible for misconduct in
office. If the government were free at any time to forestall the
judgment of the Commons by a summary dismissal of the legisla-
ture it would be in a position to establish a veritable autocracy and
free itself from effective criticism and control. The government,
it is admitted, possesses the right of appealing against the decision
of the House under ordinary circumstances but it has no constitu-
tional right to frustrate an independent expression of judgment on
the part of the popularly elected chamber. The House has its
privileges as well as the executive; and of these privileges the right
of discussion and censure are the first and most important. They
are, in truth, the primary source of parliamentary freedom.
Moreover, the King ministry had already appealed to the
electorate a few months before with somewhat untoward results.
According to constitutional usage, a ministry is not entitled to
a second dissolution in case of an unfavorable vote of the House
after a general election. In the words of Professor Jenks:
"If the ministry was formed after the existing House of Com-
mons was elected, the King must accede to the ministry's request;
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but if, on the other hand, the House of Commons was elected
since the formation of the ministry then presumably the latest
expression of the popular will is adverse to the ministry which
cannot therefore insist on the dissolution of parliament."
The power of dissolution was never intended to be used as an
instrument in the hands of the ministry to penalize the Commons
or to prevent the opposition from obtaining a victory in the House.
The government had already been afforded the right of one gen-
eral appeal to the country. On principles of good sportsmanship as
well as parliamentary practice it was not entitled to ask for a
second dissolution. For these reasons it is submitted the action of
the government in this case was not justifiable either by consti-
tutional precedent or on principles of political expediency.
The second and much more important question has to deal
with the right of the governor-general to refuse to follow the
advice of his ministry. What is the constitutional position of the
governor-general? Does the governor of one of the Dominions
occupy a position analogous to that of the king in relation to the
imperial cabinet or is he a more or less independent administrative
officer of the Crown? In other words, is he a social figurehead
or a constitutional arbiter between the political parties?
According to the ancient theory of the English constitution the
crown enjoyed the right of determining in each case whether a
dissolution should be granted or not. This right was regarded
as one of the most important of the royal prerogatives, but in
course of time this power fell under the control of the cabinet
along with the other special rights and privileges of the sovereign.
Since the reign of George III the independent exercise of the
right has fallen into desuetude. According to modern practice,
therefore, the king should follow the advice of his ministry in the
matter of dissolution as on all other questions of public policy. In
the language of Sir William Anson, "We may say then that the
prerogative of dissolution is one which the king exercises on the
advice and at the request of his ministry and that request is not
refused."
Although the sovereign has not exercised this right for the
last hundred years, it is scarcely correct to say that the power
has been completely abandoned, since there have been few if any
occasions on which the king could have done so in a legitimate
manner. The conduct of British statesmen has been oil the whole,
so essentially just and fairminded in asking for a dissolution that
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the. king has had little excuse for refusing to accept their advice.
But there are still occasions in which it is admitted by constitu-
tional authorities that the king might and probably should, exer-
cise an independent judgment not for personal reasons or partisan
purposes but for the general advantage of the state. It is not
questioned, for example, that the king should refuse to grant a
second dissolution to a ministry which has already been defeated
at a general election. The purpose of the refusal in this instance
would be to give effect to the will of the country against the arbi-
trary policy of the ministry. The king would be acting in a
quasi-judiciary capacity as the guardian of parliamentary institu-
tions and could not be suspected of attempting to set up a personal
will of his own. Constitutional authorities would recognize, more-
over, that the Crown ought not to follow the advice of his minis-
try in case they should recommend a clear and open violation of
the law or the constitution. The king is himself subject to the law
and should assist in its faithful observance. Except in a national
emergency, parliament is alone empowered to suspend or dispense
with the law of the land. It is the duty of the king, moreover, to
respect the rights and privileges of parliament, particularly in
regard to its inquisitorial and judicial activities. The king would
not be justified, for example, in dissolving parliament if the pur-
pose of the dissolution was to prevent the House of Commons
from prosecuting impeachment proceedings against any or all of
the ministers for treason or other high crimes or misdemeanors.
In brief, the king should follow the advice of his ministers provided
that it is honestly given and is not designed to defeat the lawful
will of parliament or the nation. The prerogative should be used
for the public good and not for the furtherance of the illegal
purposes of the government. These illustrations will suffice to
show that the king's power to refuse a dissolution might still be
exercised in exceptional circumstances on good constitutional
grounds but these occasions are few and far between. The desir-
ability of keeping the king entirely out of politics is so manifest
that only in a national emergency should there be any thought of
departing from the well-understood principle of ministerial respon-
sibility.
The role of the king in relation to political parties is therefore
that of conciliator rather than that of an arbitrator. As a general
proposition he must accept the advice of his ministers no matter
how undesirable it may be. He will be entitled of course, to offer
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his best counsel to his ministers and even to expostulate with them
on matters of policy but he will not be permitted to set up his
personal will or judgment against that of the government of the
day. In times of constitutional crises he may endeavor to mediate
between the two parties. He may offer his good offices to see if
some understanding or compromise may be reached so as to pre-
vent a break-down of the due course of parliamentary proceedings.
He may, with the consent of his ministers, call a round table con-
ference with the leaders of the opposition to thrash out the ques-
tion at issue, but in all these efforts he must act with the consent
or acquiescence of his ministers and not on his own independent
judgment or initiative.
As a general proposition it may be said that the English con-
stitutional system has been introduced into the self-governing
colonies almost in its entirety. But there is one striking exception
to this general rule, namely, in respect to the power of the governor
in the matter of dissolution. In some of the colonies, particularly
in Australia and New Zealand, the old colonial theory has pre-
vailed that the governor was free to decide in each particular case
whether he would or would not accept the advice of his ministers
to dissolve the House. This power has been exercised by the
Australian governors on so many occasions and on the whole has
been found so generally beneficial in its practical operations that
it has now come to be accepted almost without question. In a
recent memo on the subject of the appointment of state governors
the attorney-general of Victoria incidentally remarked, "in Aus-
tralia it is a well settled fact that a governor has the right, if on an
impartial review of the circumstances, he thinks fit to refuse a
dissolution when asked." The same principle has been followed
in New Zealand although it has not been resorted to on so many
occasions.
The early constitutional history of Canada, likewise, furnishes
several striking cases of which the Brown and Joly are probably
the best known, in which the governors of the provinces refused
to grant a dissolution to their cabinets but these instances are by
no means as numerous as in the Australian colonies. The leading
constitutional authorities of the Dominions such as Todd and
Bourinot fully acknowledged the validity of such action and
approved of its application.
"Whilst this prerogative," says Todd, "as all others in our
constitutional system, can only be administered upon the advice of
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counsellors prepared to assume full responsibility for the gov-
ernor's decision, the governor must be himself the judge of the
necessity for a dissolution. The 'constitutional discretion' of the
governor should be invoked in respect to every case wherein a
dissolution may be advised or requested by his ministers; and his
judgment ought not to be fettered, or his discretion disputed, by
inferences drawn from previous precedent, when he decides that
a proposed dissolution is unnecessary or undesirable."
Within recent years, however, the tendency has been in the
other direction, though it cannot be said that the principle of com-
plete ministerial responsibility has been fully recognized or estab-
lished as it has been in England. The whole question has been
left in a state of general uncertainty.
Various reasons have combined to bring about this difference
in theory and practice between the mother country and the
colonies. The governor of a colony occupied a somewhat different
position from the sovereign. He had a two-fold role. He was at
once the representative of the crown and the head of the locat
administration. In his former capacity he was expected to safe
guard imperial interests against colonial encroachments; and in
respect to all such interests he was not subject to colonial control,
nor could his ministers assume any legal or political responsi-
bility in respect thereto. The British government, moreover,
formerly exercised a veto power over the acts of the colonial
legislatures. This veto might be imposed either by the governor
himself or by the secretary of state for the colonies. In any case
it was the duty of the governor to follow the instructions of the
imperial authorities rather than the opinion of his local ministers.
-In short, the governor's power of independent action was an out-
standing expression of colonial subordination. But with the devel-
opment of the nationalist spirit of the Dominions there was a
corresponding growth in the powers of the colonial cabinets in
relation to the governor. It was both natural and significant that
Canada, the first of the colonies to obtain self-government and
the greatest of the Dominions, should be the first to challenge the
colonial tradition and to look to British precedents for the deter-
mination of the status of the governor.
There were particular reasons, in the case of Australia, for the
growth of a distinctive practice in regard to dissolution. Political
parties in Australia and New Zealand have never acquired the
same permanent character and tradition that they have in the
Mother Country. The political life of the colonies has been fluid.
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Parties have been little better than factions. The issues have
varied from election to election and have usually revolved around
special local interests. The old party names of the Mother
country have indeed been maintained but there have been no his-
toric principles or political philosophy. The result has been that
parliamentary life has been exceedingly complex and confused. It
was seldom that a government was able to command a strong or
unified body of supporters in parliament. In some of the Aus-
tralian legislatures changes of government were as frequent as
revolutions in Central American states. The two-party system
gave way in actual practice to the uncertain occupancy of the treas-
ury bench by short-lived coalitions. Moreover, the shortness of the
legislative session in most of the colonies made it unnecessary and
inconvenient to resort to frequent dissolutions. The factionalism
of the House was reflected in the country at large. Seldom did
a general election clearly settle any political issue or give to any
party a long term of office. There were sound political reasons in
such circumstances for the governor to refuse to accede to every
request of his temporary advisers for a dissolution of the House.
To have assented on all occasions would have resulted in a state of
chronic constitutional anarchy. The principle of parliamentary
government would have broken down entirely and it would have
become practically necessary to set up an independent or presi-
dential executive. The colonists came to realize from actual expe-
rience that the exercise of an independent discretion on the part
of the governor in such matters was not only a legitimate but a
beneficial exercise of power. All that the colonies, therefore, asked
of the governor was that he should not utilize his discretionary
power for partisan purposes but should act impartially and with
perfect good faith as among the various factions. If the ministry
was defeated the governor naturally turned to parliament to see if
the situation could be straightened out by the formation of an
alternative cabinet before resorting to an appeal to the country.
The cabinet was not entitled to a dissolution as a matter of course,
but was expected to make way for another government in case
that sufficient parliamentary support was forthcoming. In short,
the fluctuation of political parties brought about a material modifi-
cation in the workings of English parliamentary principles in Aus-
tralia as has also been the case in France and the other Continental
countries which have attempted to combine the cabinet system
with a multiplicity of factional groups. In this case the principle
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of political expediency served to strengthen the traditional con-
stitutional power of the governor in relation to his ministers. A
power which was formerly used to protect the royal prerogative
and imperial interests was unconsciously transformed in time into
a useful and effective instrument of colonial democracy.
The experience of the Australian colonies has been repeated
in the federal sphere since the establishment .of the Australian
commonwealth. The three-party system has become as marked a
feature of federal politics as it was in the colonial legislatures,
and with this system has reappeared a succession of weak and
unstable federal ministries. The governor-general has come to
assume, therefore, the same constitutional function of an impartial
referee in the federal arena that the governors had previously
exercised in the politics of the several colonies. His role has been
particularly important where the strength of the parties has been
about equally divided and where the situation has been compli-
cated by differences of opinion between the two houses.
In Canada the political situation has been distinctly different.
Since the establishment of Confederation, the two-party system
has prevailed in the Dominion as well as the provinces throughout
almost the whole period. The Dominion ministries have been long-
lived, almost without exception, and the same phenomenon has been
manifest in most of the provinces. Neither the governors-general
nor the lieutenant-governors have had much opportunity to develop
discretionary functions, even though they had desired to do so.
The natural tendency in the circumstances was for the guberna-
torial office to develop along the lines of the English Crown rather
than of the Australian governors. Constitutionally there was
little for the governor-general to do but to play a social role in
the life of the country. The lieutenant governors for the most
part followed suit, though there are several striking instances to
the contrary. But with the rise of the Progressive party, a
condition of political instability has appeared in Canada as in the
other Dominions. In these circumstances a constitutional crisis
was sure to arrive in either the Dominion or provincial govern-
ments in which the governor would have to make a difficult deci-
sion as to the right of dissolution. It was the misfortune of
Governor Byng that he was called upon to establish an important
precedent.
There is still another reason for the different usage in the
Dominions and in the Mother Country. The position of the
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governors is distinctly different in fact as well as in law from that
of the king. In England a long monarchical tradition has become
a vital part of the English constitution. The king has become the
symbol of national and imperial unity and that symbol must be
preserved at all costs. Every precaution is taken to keep the
king's person and name out of political discussions for fear of
lowering the prestige and authority of the Crown. More than
one king has had to pay a heavy penalty for attempting to play
a personal role in politics. In short, the king could not afford to
take an independent stand since a mistake would have discredited
the whole institution of monarchy, even though it did not result
in his removal from office. Even the Tory party, therefore, the
staunchest champions of the monarchical principle, have not been
averse to a limitation of the king's power in the matter of dissolu-
tion. But the governors of the Dominions have no such prestige
or tradition to maintain. They are merely temporary appointees
of the Crown subject to removal by the King at any time like
other office-holders. A mistake on the part of the governor would
and did not entail the same serious consequences as an error in
judgment on the part of the king. If a governor showed a lack
of political tact or judgment which stirred up the hostility of the
colonists, he could be recalled at any time with little inconvenience
to himself and without any impairment of the working efficiency
of the constitutional system. It was a simple matter for the
Crown to appoint a successor to an inept or an unfortunate gover-
nor. The governor therefore could afford to take the risk of play-
ing an independent role in politics if thereby he saw an oppor-
tunity of accomplishing some beneficial results. If his mediatorial
efforts were successful he performed a valuable service to the
colonies. If they failed he could suffer the opprobrium without
in any way seriously disturbing the colony or imperiling the im-
perial connection.
All these factors have combined to bring about a material
modification of the royal prerogative of dissolution in the Domin-
ions. But the question still arises which of these traditions is the
better, which is based on the sounder constitutional principles and
which is better adapted to the needs of the Dominions? In the
recent crisis in Canada the governor-general, as we have seen,
decided in favor of the so-called colonial as against the English
tradition. In other words, he conceived of the gubernatorial office
as that of a constitutional referee and not simply that of a legal
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figurehead. Most of the recent English authorities have preferred
the English precedent on the ground that it best preserves the
monarchy from political discord and that it is most compatible with
the principle of responsible government. In the words of Keith:
"The normal form of the refusal to accept ministerial advice
is when a ministry, beaten in Parliament, or which is losing its
hold on Parliament, aks for a dissolution in order that it may
strengthen its hand in the country. Now, the imperial practice in
this regard is of course, that the minister receives a dissolution
when he asks for it. There is in favor of this view the most
important authority, and the expressions of opinion which have
been made on the other side from time to time are hardly authori-
tative. It is indeed clear that the refusal of a dissolution is much
too dangerous a course for the Crown to take; it at once reduces
the Crown, however reluctantly, to be a partisan in a political
struggle. In the case of a governor this does not matter very
seriously; he is only a temporary tenant of office, and his person-
ality and popularity are not things of the highest moment. He
may discredit the post of governor and weaken the imperial con-
nection, but these things can be put right by a tactful succession
and truth to tell, both governors and ministers, as self-government
develops, seem to grow more used to work together. The gov-
ernor exercises more influence if less power than his predecessors
in the 60's and 70's, and there are fewer of those claims, pre-
posterous on both sides to an unimpassioned view, than then were
rife. But the popularity of the Crown is only borne out by abso-
lute ministerial responsibility. The loyalty of the country to the
Crown must depend in political matters on the feeling that what-
ever is done is done not as a royal whim, but at the will of a
ministry commanding influence in the country. Any other theory,
however specious, is sure in the long run to lead to the degradation
of the Crown, which owes its absolute security, as Lord John
Russell pointed out in 1839, to its standing apart from all politi-
cal strife."
This argument is particularly effective inasmuch as it ties up the
interests of the Crown with the furtherance of democratic prin-
ciples. It appeals to the Tory and the Radical alike.
But the argument, it should be observed, is still open to criti-
cism. It assumes, as a matter of fact, that the governor will
escape being drawn into the political arena by an attitude of strict
passivity. In actual fact, however, the governor may prove him-
self to be as much a partisan by acceding to the illegal or corrupt
advice of his advisers as he would by refusing in some cases for
good and substantial reasons to follow that advice in the matter
of a dissolution. If he places the power of dissolution at the
service of his cabinet to be used for purely partisan purposes he
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cannot expect to escape the censure of the opposition by simply
pleading that he had no choice in the matter. In short, he will
almost inevitably be subjected to criticism whatever decision he
may make in a bitter partisan conflict where the control of the pre-
rogative may mean the difference between victory and defeat.
The Liberals and Progressives in Canada, however, were not
so much concerned about the political immunity of the governor
general from attack as they were about the constitutional status
of Canada. They freely admit that the leading colonial authorities
lend full support to the validity of the governor-general's action
and that several colonial precedents can be cited to a similar
effect. But these authorities and precedents, they maintain, have
no applicability to the existing constitutional situation in Canada.
"Whatever may have been the position in the earlier history of
Canada, says the Hon. N. W. Rowell, one of the leading Canadian
nationalists, "there can be no doubt, as Sir Robert Borden has
stated in his Canadian Constitutional Studies, that the governor-
general of Canada is today invested with practically the same
powers and duties in this country as those appertaining to the King
in the British Isles, and he should follow the British constitutional
practice in reference to the dissolution of parliament." Since
Canada has been raised to a constitutional equality with the
Motherland, as was clearly recognized in the resolution of the
Imperial Conference of London in 1921, and in the subsequent
ratification of the Irish Free State Act by the British parliament,
there should be no doubt but that the principles of the English
constitution in respect to dissolution should be applied in the
colonies. In other words, the status of the governor-general
should be assimilated to that of the Crown. The Liberal leaders
profess to see in the governor-general's action the danger of a
return to the Downing Street regime. They made the independent
exercise of the governor's judgment the one outstanding test of
the existence of a colonial status and they attacked the exercise
of that power as incompatible with the status of the Dominions
as co-equal members of the community of nations forming the
British Commonwealth.
From an historical standpoint it must be admitted there is much
to be said in support of this contention. So long as the colonial
governors were free to exercise an independent judgment on
colonial matters by reason of their imperial office, the autonomy of
the colonies was necessarilv limited ivi purelv dlomestic w; well
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as in imperial affairs. But since the Dominions have attained a
new constitutional and international status the historical objections
to the exercise of the governor's power have lost their force since
there is no longer any occasion or justification for intervention in
Dominion affairs on the part of the Colonial Office. The consti-
tutional question at issue must now be decided on the basis of the
present utility of the exercise of the power in question and not by
an appeal to the abuses of the past. The history of the English
cabinet clearly proves that the value of political institutions varies
from age to age with changing conditions and that an institution
which was extremely dangerous to political liberty in the begin-
ning may turn out to be a most effective weapon of popular
government. The experience of the governor's prerogative in
Australia, as we have seen, bears out the same conclusion.
In the present instance, moreover, there was no necessity for
dragging Downing Street into the controversy. Throughout the
crisis there was not the slightest evidence that the governor-general
consulted with the Colonial Office in any way or that the imperial
government took any measures to influence or control the course
of the governor's action. As a matter of fact, the secretary of
state for the Dominions expressly disavowed any desire or inten-
tion to intervene in what was regarded as a strictly Canadian con-
troversy. The Colonial Office has learned from experience that
it is extremely inadvisable to get mixed up in the political affairs
of the Dominions.
On general principles, there would seem to be no sound reason
to consider the British precedent in the matter of dissolution as
conclusive evidence of a Dominion status. It has always been the
genius of the English constitution to adapt itself to varying con-
ditions. One of the rights which the Dominion nationalists have
been demanding most strongly has been the right of the Dominions
to modify their constitutions at will. Adherence to English prec-
edents which are no longer adapted to colonial conditions does
not constitute a mark of constitutional independence but of colonial
subordination. The dominions must needs be free to work out their
own constitutional conventions in accordance with their own
special needs. The multiple party system of the Dominions, as we
have seen, has introduced a new complication into the workings of
parliamentary government and there is no doubt but that this
system must be adjusted so as to function more efficiently in some
at least, of the Dominions. The Australasian colonies have already
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led the way in this respect and it now looks as though Canada may
be obliged to follow suit.
It is interesting to observe in this connection that a similar
condition of affairs recently occurred in England and has raised
the same constitution difficulty. The election of 1923 resulted in
the return of a plurality of Conservatives to the House but the
Tory government was soon after defeated by a combination of
the Labor and Liberal parties and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald suc-
ceeded to the premiership. In view of the fact that none of the
parties enjoyed a clear majority in the House, Mr. Asquith, ex-
Liberal premier, very properly raised the question as to whether
a minority government would be entitled to demand a dissolution
whenever it so desired and very strongly expressed the opinion
that the King would be justly entitled in these circumstances to
refuse to accept such advice and to look to the House for deter-
mination of the question at issue. This view stirred up a lively
discussion both inside and outside the Commons, particularly on
the part of the Labor leaders. In this particular instance the
King did not see fit to follow the course outlined by the Liberal
leader but upon the defeat of the government shortly afterwards
granted a dissolution to Ramsay McDonald as a matter of course.
The fact that the question was raised by the Liberal, not by the
Conservative party, affords sufficient evidence that the proposed
innovation was not prompted by any desire to strengthen the
royal prerogative, but by a conscious effort to grapple with a
perplexing parliamentary situation which threatened to become
more or less permanent. It is at least interesting to speculate that
if this unsettled condition of affairs should prevail for an
extended period of time it may become necessary to modify the
practice of the English constitution in the direction of the Aus-
tralian precedent so as to prevent a possible ministerial abuse of
the power of dissolution. On the other hand, it is safe to predict
that the restoration of the two-party system will undoubtedly
serve to strengthen the existing control of the cabinet over the
crown.
At this point of the discussion, the question of the prerogative
of the governor-general gets mixed up with the question of the
mode of his appointment. Colonial nationalists will always feel
somewhat suspicious of Downing Street so long as their governor-
generals are appointed from Westminster. The attainment of
complete Dominion autonomy logically demands that the nomina-
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tion and appointment of the governors should be transferred from
the British to the colonial governments. In that event the
governor-general would no longer be looked upon as an official of
the British ministry, but would be regarded as the formal
political head of the local administration. In order to meet colonial
objections to the present system of selection, a new convention
of the imperial constitution has been adopted by which the British
government makes it a point to consult the Dominion governments
before making an appointment. In other words, there is a ten-
dency to look upon the Governor-General as a diplomatic repre-
sentative of the English crown in the colonies rather than as a
constitutional official, and the mode of appointment has therefore
been assimilated to that in use in the diplomatic service. In the
case of the most recent appointment in Canada, it is understood
that the British government submitted the names of several possi-
ble nominees to the Canadian premier and permitted Mr. King to
select the one whom he regarded as most desirable..
But even this precedent does not go far enough to satisfy
some of the more radical nationalists. There has been a strong
movement in Australia among the Labor party to limit appoint-
ments to the governorships of the respective states to Australian
citizens only and a memorandum was recently presented to the
secretary of state for the Dominions signed by the Labor premiers
of five of the Australian states to this effect. The memo did not
express any dissatisfaction with the conduct or policies of past
English appointees but it did urge that the principle of self-govern-
ment required the selection of local governors. There is nothing,
of course, in the present imperial constitution to prevent the selec-
tion of a governor from one of the inhabitants of a Dominion. A
precedent had already been established in the choice of Mr.
Timothy I-Iealy as representative of the Crown in the Irish Free
State. It was evident, however, that Mr.. Amery, Secretary for
the Colonies, did not approve of the Australian Labor proposal,
but he very properly reaffirmed the principle which had been laid
down by Lord Milner, that the question was one for the Aus-
tralians to decide for themselves and that the British government
would abide by their decision. But until there was a stronger
evidence of a preponderant opinion in Australia in favor of the
change he was unwilling to reverse the traditional policy of the
colonial office. "If the premiers' proposal is to be adopted, he
declared, "there should be no doubt that Australian opinion is
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generally in favor of the change and so strongly in favor of it that
a subsequent demand for its reversal is not likely to arise." It is
somewhat difficult to understand on principle, however, why the
views of five Labor ministries in favor of local governors should
not outweigh the more conservative views of the Nationalist gov-
ernment in Victoria in favor of the maintenance of the existing
system of appointment. It is this tendency of the Colonial Office
to cling as long as possible to the old imperial traditions which
occasions the lingering suspicions on the part of the colonial
nationalists as to the genuineness of the acceptance of the principle
of Dominion equality by the British government. So long as this
suspicion continues Liberal and Labor governments in the Donin-
ions are naturally reluctant to take any action which would tend
to increase the powers of a British governor. From a political
standpoint there are certain manifest advantages in the selection
of a distinguished and impartial British official rather than a local
politician as nominal head of the executive in the Dominions, but
these advantages in the minds of the colonial nationalists arc
insufficient to offset the danger of imperial participation in colonial
politics. It is this feeling of suspicion, actual or artificial, which
is back of much of the criticism of -the recent action of the
governor-general in Canada; and it is upon this fear that some of
the less scrupulous politicians are prone to play in stirring up
opposition among the "habitants" to the alleged menace of Down-
ing Street.
It is exceedingly unfortunate that the question of the mode of
selecting the governor-general should have become mixed up with
the question of the nature of his office with particular reference
to the power of dissolution. There is, as we have seen, a historical
and also a potential connection between the two issues but at heart
they are fundamentally distinct and should not be confused. The
question of the discretionary power of the governor-general in
the matter of dissolution would come up for decision irrespective
of the nationality of the governor or the mode of his selection. In
fact, the same question has already arisen in England and there
are several instances in which it has appeared in the case of the
lieutenant governors of the Canadian provinces as well as in con-
nection with the governors of the Australasian states and com-
monwealth. But the issue has again been confused in the Canadian
provinces by reason of the fact that the lieutenant governors are
appointed by the Dominion government and may consequently
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belong to a different political party from that of their advisers.
As a general proposition there have been few disjigreements be-
tween the lieutenant governors and their cabinets but on one or
two occasions the provincial governors have been accused of using
their position in order to further the interests of their political
friends at Ottawa at the expense of their constitutional advisers
in the province. If these external influences could be elimin-
ated in both Dominion and provincial, politics the question of dis-
solution could be decided upon its merits alone since no matter
how or by whom the governor-general or lieutenant governor
might be chosen or elected he would still have to decide it each
case whether he should or should not accede to the advice of his
ministry. The position of a popularly elected governor would not
differ the slightest in this respect from a royal official.
Recent developments in colonial politics would seem to empha-
size the advantages of clothing the governor with certain discre-
tionary powers in respect to his cabinet. Politics is essentially a
game, perhaps the greatest of all games, and played with a zest
and enthusiasm such as is seldom found in other forms of sport.
So long as human nature remains as it is the politician will play
to win. But in order that the game should be played fairly and
honestly there must be a well-designed body of rules to govern
the sport, and above all, a high-minded and impartial referee to
see that the rules be faithfully observed by all parties. There
is almost an irresistible temptation on the part of the party in
power to abuse its authority in order to strengthen or maintain
its position or ascendency. To dish a political opponent is too
often considered clever political tactics.
The House of Commons has realized this danger by providing
for the entire separation of the position of speaker from that of.
political leadership in the House. The speaker has been elevated
into the position of an impartial presiding officer whose duty it is
to see that even-handed justice is distributed between the contend-
ing parties in the House. He has become the great guardian of
the rights of the minority against the excess of power on the part
of the majority. He is the constitutional referee who holds the
respective parties to the strict observance of parliamentary order
and fair play. Every care and precaution is taken to remove him
from the temptations" of party warfare. Once he is elected to his
high office he is supposed to drop all party affiliations and to for-
get all party differences. Any deviation on his part from a policy
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of strict and absolute neutrality would cost him the confidence of
the House and lower the reputation of the office. The signifi-
cance of the position of the speaker in the English parliamentary
system, as also to a somewhat smaller degree in the Dominion
legislatures, can best be appreciated by comparing his position
with that of the presiding officer of the United States House of
Representatives. The speaker of the American House is a strong
party man elected by partisan supporters and expected to pro-
mote partisan ends. He is in truth one of the two great outstand-
ing leaders of the majority party in the House. Thanks to his
combination of the powers of speaker with those of a party leader,
he developed into the czar of the House. The minority were almost
powerless to stand out against him, and it became necessary to
modify his powers so as to preserve the independence of the
House itself.
The same political situation is presented in the larger political
arena outside the House. The dangers of the abuse of powers
on the part of the executive in matters of administration are very
much greater than in legislative matters inside the House. If the
governor-general is reduced to the position of a mere figure-head
who must register the will of his advisers, there will be no effective
check upon the arbitrary power of the Ministry. There will be
a czarism of the cabinet even more dangerous and autocratic than
the czarism of the speaker in the House of Representatives. The
same consideration that demands the separation of the functions
of the speaker from the leadership of the party in the House of
Commons likewise demands that there should be set up an impartial
presiding constitutional referee to maintain the principles of jus-
tice and fair play in the conduct of the administrative affairs of
the country. The ministers of the day cannot be safely en-
trusted with the power of modifying the rules of the game at will
in order to suit their own political purposes. They ought not to
act as judges in their own cases.
The situation is rendered all the more acute by reason of the
fact that the game of politics is no longer played on a strictly
amateur basis by a group of country gentlemen. The old social
amenities, which played so large a part in the life of the English
parliament, have been gradually giving way. The place of the
amateur in politics has been taken by the professional, and with
the introduction of the professional politician the tone and spirit
of English political life have undergone a change, in some respects
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at least, for the worse. The professional politician must win in
order to hold his place; if unsuccessful he is soon eliminated from
the game. Moreover, the political stakes are now much larger
than they formerly were. With the rapid extension of the activi-
ties of the government there has been a tremendous multiplication
in the number of offices to be filled. An immense political patron-
age is now placed at the service of the government which can be
used to strengthen the position of the government throughout the
country. In many of the Dominions the spoils system has been
introduced with dangerous results to the efficiency and honesty of
the course of administration. Vast expenditures of the govern-
ment on public works have become an even more powerful agency
for .the distribution of party favors and the furtherance of party
purposes. In short, a tremendous political organization has been
the maintenance of office. These factors have been still further
built up whose sole interest is dependent upon the acquisition or
strengthened by the development of great industrial and financial
interests whose business prospects are dependent upon the policy
of a political party or parties. Questions of politics have been
largely transformed into questions of economics. Electoral strug-
gles are waged over questions of fiscal or financial policies which
vitally concern large sections of the community. The advent of
the Socialist party has intensified the bitterness of party warfare
by challenging the existence of the whole economic and social or-
ganization of the country. Extreme partisans on both sides are
willing to resort to almost any measures in order to sCcure control
over the executive through which they hope to determine the eco-
nomic policies of the day.
The situation is all the more dangerous in the Dominions by
reason of the fact that there are not the same high traditions of
political life overseas as have prevailed in England during the last
half century. The Dominion parliaments have not succeeded in
attracting the same high type of members into the House of Com-
mons as have gone into the British parliament. The best training
and ability haye been diverted into business rather than into poli-
tics. There is not the splendid tradition of office-holding nor the
same honorable status attached to service in the administrative
departments of the government. The spoils system, as we have
seen, has materially lowered the tone of political life. Govern-
ments have seldom scrupled to use all the advantages of office
holding in order to secure a return to power. The administrative
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service is not divorced from politics and parties vie with one
another in the promise of public works for various constituencies.
In England, on the other hand, the cabinet enjoys no special advan-
tages in making an appeal to the country. As a matter of fact,
the possession of power is often a serious disadvantages in seeking
a return to office. There, it is almost the invariable rule that the
opposition are successful in winning by-elections, but in the
Dominions the reverse is true. In the present instance, it must
be confessed, the Liberal party in Canada was not so much con-
cerned over the constitutional issue as over the loss of control
over the electoral machinery. The government has always ex-
pected to control this machinery and to use it for its own political
advantage at the expense of the opposition. It is not surprising
in the circumstances that by-elections have usually resulted in the
return of government candidates and that the terms of office of
both Dominion and provincial ministries have been marked by
length of years rather than by intellectual distinction or legislative
or administrative accomplishments.
In brief the power of the cabinet is practically uncontrolled
during the recess of parliament save insofar as the cabinet may
see fit to listen to the wisdom or counsels of the governor-general.
There is no effective check upon the excesses of partisanship, such
as is provided in the House by the independent power of the
speaker. In England the honorable tradition of office has afforded
some safeguard against the abuse of executive power and it has
not been necessary in consequence to call upon the prerogative of
the king. In Australia, the governors of the several colonies have
served to some extent as a balance-wheel of the constitution. But
in Canada, unfortunately, there have been no such moderating
influences, and if the discretionary power of the Governor-General
is to pass away like that of the king there would seem to be little
prospect of curbing the growing dangers of partisanship.
The increasing power of the cabinet may likewise become a
menace to parliament itself. Formerly the ministry was looked
upon as the servant of parliament but today it threatens to become
the master. To endow the cabinet with unlimited power of life
and death over the Commons would impair the independence of
that body. Many of the members would scarcely feel free to
oppose the policy of the executive while a threat of dissolution
was hanging over their heads. The very existence of responsible
government depends upon the vigor and freedom of parliamentary
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN CANADA
criticism. Any impairment of that freedom would result in the
establishment of an irresponsible oligarchy in place of a responsible
ministry. The position of the House would be rendered all the
more dubious by reason of the fact that the Cabinet can not only
force the members to run the risk and bear the expense of frequent
elections, but through its control of political favors and election
machinery can sometimes win an unfair advantage at the polls.
The power of dissolution can be used in such circumstances not
for the purpose of eliciting the views of the country at large but
of defeating the free expression of public opinion and securing
the return of a subservient majority to the House. In other
words, the machinery of self-government may be turned against
democracy itself. But parliament, it should be remembered, has
rights as well as the cabinet and these rights both from a legal
and historical standpoint have priority over the claims of the
.government, and it is the duty of the governor to respect these
rights. The cabinet is undoubtedly entitled to advise the governor-
general at all times and in all matters; but parliament is equally
entitled to express its judgment upon the conduct of the ministry
and the public questions of the day, and its judgment should pre-
vail except where the mandate of the country is practically ex-
hausted or where new issues have arisen upon which the country
has had no opportunity to express an opinion.
The position of the governor-general, as we have seen, would
be materially altered by the permanent establishment of the multi-
ple party system in the House. In the past the governor-general
has not ventured to set up his judgment against the strong united
will of the cabinet and parliament. But with the adoption of the
bloc system the varied opinions of minority groups would be sub-
stituted for the stable will of the majority. The governor would
now have to deal with a weak cabinet and a disorganized legisla-
ture. Only with the greatest difficulty could the king's govern-
ment be carried on. In some of the European countries where
this condition has prevailed the parliamentary system has broken
down completely and has been supplanted for the time being by
dictatorships. In despair the people have preferred autocracy to
anarchy. Fortunately the Dominions have not yet fallen into
this sorry plight, but in the Australian colonies it has been found
necessary to revive some of the ancient prerogatives of the Crown
in order to stabilize the chaotic situation.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In Canada, on the other hand, the two-party system has struck
much deeper roots in the political soil. From time to time third-
party movements have sprung up in some of the provinces and
have flourished for a season but they have all failed to stand the
test of time. The present *farmers' movement in the Northwest
seems to show greater signs of permanency inasmuch as it is
closely bound up with the great co6perative movement of the
grain growers' association. The political program of the party
has been based upon a vital and permanent economic interest.
Should the multiple party system continue and the Progressives
succeed in retaining the balance of power in the House the govern-
ment would doubtless find it necessary to resort to some form
of coalition ministry such as has been employed ii Australia for
several years past. The King ministry had already taken a step
in this direction at the last session by entering into a working
agreement with the Progressive leaders but this arrangement, as
we have seen, did not work very satisfactorily. The people of
Canada shared the English objection to coalition ministries. If a
coalition ministry should prove unworkable in practice the only
alternative available would seem to be the adoption of some modi-
fied form of the presidential system which would enable the admin-
istration to be carried on more or less independently of the tur-
moil of parties in the popular chamber. In other words, the execu-
tive would have to be separated to a larger degree from the legisla-
ture. It is interesting to observe that several of the Progressive
leaders have already advanced the opinion that the English parlia-
mentary system should be scrapped so as to make way for a more
independent and scientifically efficient administrative regime, but
these views have not yet found much favor either in the House of
Commons or in the country at large.
The political advantages of converting, the governor-general
into a constitutional referee become somewhat clearer when we
remember that the Canadian constitution, like the English, is essen-
tially a political, not a legal constitution, based upon the principle
of the concentration of power and responsibility. There is no
theory of separation of powers, no elaborate system of checks
and balances, no specific guarantee of individual rights and prop-
erty, such as are to be found in the American constitution, nor
does the Canadian judiciary serve as the general guardian of the
constitution against legislative encroachments upon the so-called
natural and inalienable rights of the citizen. For the protection
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of their civil and political rights the Canadian public are forced
to rely upon the honesty of the government, the independence and
good faith of parliament and the publicity of its proceedings and
above all, upon their own lively and intelligent interest in the
affairs of state. Thus far, it must be admitted this high democratic
faith in the justice and competence of both officers and people has
been splendidly vindicated in the political history of the country,
but there are certain tendencies, as we have seen, which point
towards the growing danger of the abuse of political power by the
cabinet.
But if the Australian experiment is to be followed, it will prob-
ably be found advisable to effect a change not only in the mode of
appointing the governor-general and lieutenant governors but also
in the type and character of the men to be selected for this impor-
tant function. The holder of this high office should possess some-
thing more than social rank and prestige or the qualifications of a
successful politician; he should be endowed with those qualities
which are demanded of a speaker,-tact, a judicial temperament
and a thorough knowledge of constitutional and parliamentary law
and practice. It might be good policy indeed to reward successful
speakers upon retirement with an appointment as representative of
the Crown in the Dominion or one of the provinces. A suggestion
has been made on several occasions that the governor-general and
lieutenant governors should be recruited from the ranks of the
higher judiciary. This method of selection would doubtless secure
an excellent type of official but it would be open to the serious
objection that the judiciary might thereby become involved in
politics. The important matter in any case would be to select
an outstanding man who commanded the respect and confidence of
the country by reason of his unquestioned probity and fairmind-
edness.
There is a possibility, of course, that a strong minded governor
might seek to glorify his office and to substitute his own will for
that of his advisers. But this danger, it is.believed, would be ex-
ceedingly small. Tradition and precedent alike have combined to
fix the status of the governor and to assign to him the modest role
that he can play. The'governor's office has been considered a non-
political position by long established custom. The acceptance of
the appointment carries with it the necessary implication that the
appointee has retired from politics. Constitutional precedents,
moreover, have fairly clearly established the extremely narrow
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limits of his discretionary authority. To exceed these limits
would involve the risk of loss of office if not of impeachment pro-
ceedings. Still less can the governor-general escape from the
control of his ministers or free himself from the strict application
of the principle of responsible government. Even in the extreme
case in which he might refuse to follow the advice of his cabinet
he must find other ministers who are prepared to assume full retro-
active responsibility for his independent action. The original deci-
sion may have been the act of the governor alone but the sole and
exclusive responsibility is that of the succeeding and ratifying
government.
The recent embroglio at Ottawa affords an excellent illustration
of the practical workings of this principle. Lord Byng undoubt-
edly used his own judgment in refusing to grant a dissolution to
Mr. King. But on accepting office, Mr. Meighen was constitu-
tionally obliged to accept full responsibility for the governor-
general's action in refusing a dissolution. The correctness of this
principle is clearly established by many precedents, both English
and colonial. Some of the more belligerent Liberal politicians
were inclined at first to attack the governor-general personally but
they were soon made to realize that these criticisms were not only
politically inexpedient but were likewise constitutionally unsound
and exceedingly dangerous in principle. Henceforth the fulmin-
ations of the opposition were directed against the Meighen govern-
ment only.
The discussion thus far has been concerned only with the
general principles which should be applied to this particular
Canadian situation where cabinet and Commons were more or less
at odds. The constitutional position of the governor, it is sub-
mitted, would be distinctly different if the cabinet were supported
by a good working majority in the House of Commons. In this
latter case the governor would be entitled to expostulate with the
cabinet if he disapproved of their policy, and in exceptional cases
to use his good offices to bring about a compromise or settlement
between the government and opposition if matters should reach
an impasse in parliament. But he would not be justified in dis-
solving the House in the face of both cabinet and parliament. In
short, he could play the role of a mediator but not of a judge.
The refusal to accept the advise of his ministers in such circum-
stances would be equivalent to a challenge of the authority of par-
liament itself, which the legislature would most strongly resent.
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On almost ill the occasions in which governors have attempted to
override the House the results have turned out to be disastrous for
the reputation and prestige of the governors concerned.
We must now turn to the consideration of the third question
at issue, namely, the constitutionality of the mode in which Mr.
Meighen organized his temporary ministry and attempted to put
through the necessary supplies. The regular procedure to be fol-
lowed by an incoming ministry in such circumstances has been
clearly established by long parliamentary usage. The new premier
on accepting the responsibility of forming a ministry should have
asked for the adjournment of the House in order to constitute
his government and to secure the return or re-election of his newly
appointed ministers. Upon their election, the House should have
proceeded with the cooperation or acquiescence of the opposition
to grant the necessary supplies and to wind up the legislative busi-
ness of the session. But Mr. Meighen, for some unexplained
reason, chose to resort to a series of devious expedients to hold
on to office until the close of the session. Upon his accession to
the premiership, which automatically vacated his own seat in the
House, he proceeded to set up a makeshift ministry of seven
members under the temporary leadership of Sir Henry Drayton,
not one of the members of which had taken the oath of office
upon assuming the duties of their respective departments although
they had all been sworn in as members of the Privy Council. In
order to avoid the necessity of holding by-elections in their con-
stituencies, the ministers in question were appointed by order in
council, acting ministers only, without portfolio. According to
English parliamentary practice, a minister of the Crown, upon
receiving his portfolio, is called upon to take a special oath of
office in addition to his oath as a privy councellor, but in Canada,
according to the Hon. Hugh Guthrie, Acting Minister of Justice,
the practice was different and for the past thirty-five years no such
oath had been required of ministers without portfolio. As acting
ministers only they did not receive any fee or salary for their
services and consequently were not guilty of a breach of the inde-
pendence of parliament. The correctness of this view found
further support in the opinions which were expressed by the
clerk of the privy council and the deputy minister of justice, up-
holding the legality of the procedure in this case.
But these contentions, it is submitted, fail to recognize the
fundamental distinction which exists between the acts of a mere
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de facto and a de jure government. There can be no question of
the right of a duly constituted cabinet to appoint one of its mem-
bers to take temporary charge of the affairs of a particular depart-
ment during the absence or illness of the regular minister without
thereby occasioning the resignation of the acting minister in ques-
tion. This exception, like most other usages of the constitution,
is based upon practical political convenience, since it enables the
work of the department to be carried on with a minimum of inter-
ruption and at the same time without impairing the responsibility
of the government for the conduct of the department. But the
situation at Ottawa was entirely different. Here there was no
duly constituted cabinet, no vacancy to be temporarily filled by a
colleague, no legal responsibility for the administration of particu-
lar departments. The whole proceedings from beginning to end
were a legal sham, a specious evasion of the statutory requirement
that a minister must seek re-election, and a fraud upon the consti-
tutional right of parliament to hold legally appointed ministers
responsible for the conduct of their particular departments. In
the words of Hon. N. W. Rowell:
"The course pursued of attempting to carry on a government
without his ministers taking the oath of office or going back for
re-election was entirely outside of, and foreign to, British consti-
tutional practice, and in violation of the express statutory provision
that members of the House accepting any portfolio thereby vacate
their seats and must submit themselves for re-election. Individual
cases of members of former administration being admitted as
members of a cabinet without portfolio afford no excuse for seek-
ing in defiance of the law to constitute a ministry in that way and
to entrust that ministry with the administration of public affairs."
Since the government was not regularly constituted and its
members were not duly sworn in as heads of their respective de-
partments, it is difficult to see upon what constitutional ground
the ministers either collectively or individually were entitled to ask
supplies on behalf of the Crown. According to English constitu-
tional law, a request for supplies can come only from the Crown
through one of his Majesty's responsible ministers, in order to
assure full legal responsibility for the voting and expenditure of
public funds. But this sound rule of public policy would be de-
feated if a stop-gap ministry which was only intended to act until
the government could be properly organized, were authorized to
proceed with the passage of the budget. The House was well
justified, therefore, on constitutional grounds, in refusing to recog-
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nize the right of a body of temporary and unsworn ministers to
direct the business of the House and to ask for supplies for their
respective departments. "If Mr. Meighen," as Mr. Rowell well
says, "was not prepared to form a government according to law
and custom of our constitution, he should not have accepted the
task of forming a government."
If it be admitted that the cabinet was not regularly constituted
the question necessarily arises, was the governor-general justified
in granting Mr. Meighen's request for a dissolution upon the de-
feat of the ministry in the House? The attitude of the governor-
general, from the Liberal standpoint seems strangely inconsistent
if not partisan, in according to the Conservative ministry the right
of dissolution which had been refused to the Liberal leader a few
days earlier under similar circumstances. This striking change
of policy looked all the more peculiar in view of the fact that the
Liberal government, which had been duly constituted, had retained
the support of the House for several months and was never
formally defeated, whereas the Conservative ministry was of
doubtful origin, had maintained itself in office for a few days
only and was overthrown on a direct vote of want of confidence.
This criticism appears plausible at first sight but on analysis
proves to be faulty. At the time of the defeat of the King minis-
try there was reason to hope and possibly believe that another
ministry could be formed which would secure the support of the
House for the time being, at least. The prospects looked promis-
ing at first as the Progressives agreed to cooperate with Mr.
Meighen in putting through the business of the session, but when
they turned against the government a few days later on the ques-
tion of parliamentary privilege it became manifest that no stable
administration could be formed in the existing parliamentary con-
fusion. What then could the governor-general do? It was use-
less to turn to parliament for assistance since parliament did not
know its own mind. His ministers had been defeated it was
true, but by the narrowest of majorities; nevertheless, they were
still the government of the day, the only active and qualified body
to whom he could turn at that moment for counsel and advice.
From his standpoint there was but one course to pursue, namely,
to accede to the advice of the ministry and dissolve parliament in
the hope that the country would give a clear-cut decision upon
the questions at issue.
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From the standpoint of the Liberal and Progressive majority
in parliament, however, the government was not constitutionally
entitled to a dissolution. In their eyes the whole organization of
the ministry was tainted with illegality and parliament had express-
ly declared that the ministry was not legally competent to direct
the business of the House. This was not an ordinary case of par-
liament expressing its disapproval of the policy of a recognized
government. The question now raised was much more vital. It
concerned the legitimacy, not the conduct of the government. The
whole legal status of the government was at stake. In the judg-
ment of parliament the Premier was the only member of the cabi-
net who was duly appointed. All the other ministers were mere
interlopers who were exercising their functions in violation of the
law of the land and of parliamentary privileges. Since the minis-
try was improperly established it necessarily followed that all its
acts were invalid and it was not legally empowered to advise the
governor-general in matters of state. The ministers, in short,
were no more entitled to ask for the dissolution of the House than
would have been any other seven members of the privy-council in
no way connected with the government.
It is no easy matter to escape from the force of this reasoning.
The ministry had shown little consideration for the formal require-
ments of the constitution or to the principle of parliamentary
independence and parliament had struck back by challenging tile
legal status of the government itself. The legal rather than tile
political aspects of the controversy were now brought to the front.
The political doctrine of ministerial responsibility had little appli-
cation to the legal point at issue. The question was no longer
one, should the governor-general follow the advice of his ministers
but rather, had the governor-general a body of ministers with
whom he could legally advise? Up to that time the constitutional
position of the ministry had been doubtful but parliament had now
placed upon it the brand of illegality, and from that moment, it is
submitted, the ministry were no longer entitled to command the
ear of the governor-general. They should at once have resigned
to make way for a ministry whose legitimacy parliament was pre-
pared to recognize. Upon the appointment and re-election of the
new ministers the Premier would have been constitutionally en-
titled to ask for a dissolution, which would doubtless have been
granted as a matter of course, in order to straighten out the par-
liamentary tangle. But whatever the final judgment may be as
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to the legal status of the Meighen government there can be little
doubt but that its political tactics were not calculated to raise the
standard of parliamentary life. These clever devices had alto-
gether too much the appearance of sharp practice, if not of inten-
tional violation of the spirit of the constitution. And it is very
evident from the election returns that the country at large did not
approve of such maneuvers.
The final phase of the constitutional controversy raged around
the cavalierly mode in which parliament was dissolved. Upon the
defeat of his ministry, Mr. Meighen asked the governor-general
for a dissolution, which was immediately granted, but unfortunate-
ly without complying with the customary formalities which accom-
pany the dosing of the session. According to English constitu-
tional usage the King may dissolve parliament if the House is
then in session either by appearing in person or by royal commis-
sion. But the usual method is first to prorogue parliament and
then to issue a royal proclamation of dissolution. But Mr.
Meighen dispensed with all these constitutional observances. A
private messenger conveyed the information to the House that its
life was ended. Much more serious, however, from the standpoint
of the public interest, was the failure of the premier to secure the
assent of the governor-general to the various bills which had
passed both Houses and were awaiting his excellency's signature.
As a result of this hasty dissolution much of the business of the
session went by the board, to the serious inconvenience of the
public in some cases. The opposition were quite justified in the
circumstances, in arraigning the government both for its dis-
courtesy towards the House and for its flagrant departure from
parliamentary precedent.
Throughout the whole constitutional struggle it will be ob-
served both the Liberal and Conservative leaders showed little
consideration for the privileges of parliament and the House of
Commons was well within its rights in calling the respective gov-
ernments to account for their general attitude of disregard, if not
of disrespect, towards the representative of the people.
"Parliament," as Mr. Rowell well says, "was entitled to know
from Mr. Meighen, the composition of its real ministry, not his
so-called temporary ministry, to have the opportunity of voting
supplies to a real ministry to carry on the business of the country
and to have the work of the session saved by the governor-general
giving his assent to the bills passed and formally proroguing par-
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liament just as it was entitled to pass upon the Customs Report
and the Stevens' amendment before it was dissolved."
To the Progressive party belongs most of the credit for de-
fending the rights of parliament. The members of the two old
parties were too deeply concerned in the struggle for office to stand
out against the policies of their respective leaders in defence of
the independence of the House. It was the Progressive group
which brought about the defeat of Mr. King on the Customs
scandal and of Mr. Meighen on the constitutional issue. On this
occasion, at least, it will be admitted the presence of a third party
in the House contributed greatly towards the furtherance of honest
government and the maintenance of the self-respect of parlia-
ment.
Although the constitutional issue loomed large in the parlia-
mentary debates at the close of the session, it assumed much more
modest proportions in the electoral campaign. In truth, the voters
were not greatly interested in the legal aspects of the controversy.
They knew that the constitution was not seriously in danger and
that both parties had been guilty of jockeying for a favorable
position; and they accordingly turned their attention to the dis-
cussion of the fiscal question, of local and sectional grievances
and of the personalities of the respective party leaders. The
Canadian public, it should be added, in marked contrast to the
American, has not been trained in the consideration of questions
of constitutionality. The practical working of responsible govern-
ment has tended to convert so-called constitutional issues into
questions of public policy to be decided upon grounds of political
morality or party expediency. The voters are prone to look back
of the legal phases of the struggle to inquire into the real eco-
nomic and social influences which have occasioned the legal prob-
lem. The factional character of the election returns clearly shows
the preponderance of racial and economic influences in the minds
of the electorate. There is little doubt, however, but that the
Liberal party will take advantage of its victory to demand not
only from the governor general but also from the British govern-
ment, a full recognition of the principle of ministerial responsibility
for all executive acts as a vindication of its claims to a status of
constitutional equality with the Mother Country in the British com-
monwealth of nations. It is significant that the premier's first
public declaration of policy contained an announcement that the
Honorable Vincent Massey would be appointed the first Canadian
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diplomatic representative at Washington. The government was
resolved to assert Canada's equal national status at the very out-
set.
Another important result of the election has been the restor-
ation of the two-party system. The so-called Liberal-Progressive
group has joined the Liberal party and its leader, Mr. Forke, has
been admitted into the cabinet. Thanks to this combination, the
government now commands an independent majority in the House
over all other parties. Political stability has been re-established.
For this result, at least, the whole country is profoundly thankful.
The favorable outcome of the general election in this respect tends
to confirm the belief of the Canadian public in the superior merit
of their own form of government over that on this side of the
line. The constitutional harmony of the executive and the legis-
lature has been quickly restored, whereas the deadlock might have
continued indefinitely under the American system. The demon-
stration of efficiency seems to be complete. It would be interest-
ing to try to forecast the course of events if the election had been
indecisive and had left the position of parties practically un-
changed. It is possible, though highly improbable, in that case
that the public might have been tempted to experiment with some
modification of the presidential system or, as seems more likely,
with an adaptation of the Swiss federal executive, as had been
strongly advocated in the Australian national convention of 1891.
But these speculations are futile in the circumstances. The
elections clearly demonstrated that the Canadian people still cling
to the two-party system and that that system in conjunction with
the principle of responsible government affords to the democracy
of the country a quick and effective means of ascertaining public
opinion and of carrying that opinion into execution in both the
legislative and administrative branches of the government. For
the time being, at least, the country's political faith in the parlia-
mentary system seems fully justified.
